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Abstract 
There are several ways that the Commissioner of Taxation may indirectly 
obtain priority over unsecured creditors. This is contrary to the principle of pari 
passu, a principle endorsed by the 1988 Harmer Report as one that is a 
fundamental objective of the law of insolvency. As the law and practice of 
Australia’s taxation regime evolves, the law is being drafted in a manner that 
is inconsistent with the principle of pari passu. The natural consequence of 
this development is that it places at risk the capacity of corporate and 
bankruptcy laws to coexist and cooperate with taxation laws. This paper 
posits that undermining the consistency of Commonwealth legislative 
objectives is undesirable. We suggest that one means of addressing the 
inconsistency is to examine whether there is a clearly aligned theoretical basis 
for the development of these areas of law and the extent that alignment 
addresses these inconsistencies.  This forms the basis for the 
recommendations made around such inconsistencies using statutory priorities 
as an exemplar. 
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Introduction 
It is likely that in most bankrupt and insolvent estates, there is debt owed to the 
Australian Taxation Office (ATO).1 A somewhat neglected area in terms of academic 
study,2 the area needs attention since the position of the ATO as a creditor should 
be relatively clear. In theory Australia has moved to place the ATO in the same 
position as any other creditor with no particular priorities.3 However, the reality is 
somewhat different. We suggest that a clash has emerged between the provisions of 
relevant taxation legislation and the legislation that governs corporate and personal 
insolvency, particularly in the context of statutory priorities. 
The format of this paper first considers the background to the difficulties that have 
arisen. It provides examples of the inconsistency and considers the approach taken 
by the courts in resolving this conflict. We posit that there is a need for an underlying 
theoretical approach that provides a more consistent development of law and finally 
make preliminary suggestions as to how the emerging inconsistencies may be 
resolved. 
 
ATO priorities – the historical context 
The long established principle of pari passu holds that all creditors receive a 
proportionate share of those assets available for distribution on insolvency.4 The 
principle is enshrined in s 555 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth): 
                                                 
1 Although no data is specifically released on this issue some indication may be found in ASIC data from 
external administrators’ reports. This data is drawn only from companies in insolvency administrations where 
the insolvency practitioner has prepared a report to ASIC under s 533,422 or 438D. Accepting that limitation, 
the evidence provided is that in 2007-08, 81.3% of companies had some unpaid taxes and charges whilst the 
figures for 2008-09 and 2009-10 were 77.3% and 76.4% respectively. Figures released in the same report in 
2008 indicated the figures were between 84 and 87%. : See Australian Securities and Investment Commission, 
(2008) REPORT 132: External administrators: Schedule B statistics 1 July 2004–30 June 2007available at 
http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/REP_132.pdf/$file/REP_132.pdf.  
Downloaded 3 April 2010. 
And  Australian Securities and Investment Commission, (2010) REPORT 225:Insolvency Statistics: External 
administrators’ Reports 1 July 2007–30 June 2010 available at 
http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/rep225.pdf/$file/rep225.pdf 
Downloaded 3 April 2010. 
2 An exception being  Symes  C., Statutory Priorities in Corporate  Insolvency Law , Ashgate, Surrey 2008 
3 See Taxation Debts (Abolition of Crown Priority) Act 1980 . 
4  See generally Vanessa Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles (Cambridge University 
Press, 2002); Rizwaan Jameel Mokal, Corporate insolvency law: Theory and application (Oxford University 
Press, 2005). 
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Except as otherwise provided by this Act, all debts and claims proved in a 
winding up rank equally and, if the property of the company is insufficient to 
meet them in full, they must be paid proportionately. 
The statutory priority granted to the Commonwealth for payment of outstanding tax 
liabilities owed by an insolvent corporation was mostly removed by the enactment of 
the Taxation Debts (Abolition of Crown Priorities) 1980 (Cth). The few remaining 
priorities, particularly those in relation to unpaid withholding tax and certain 
unremitted deductions, were abolished in 19935 following a lengthy consideration of 
the 1988 recommendations of the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) 
General Insolvency Inquiry (generally referred to as the Harmer Report). 6  The 
Harmer Report recommended that the pari passu principle be retained by insolvency 
law, subject to certain qualifications such as the doctrine not impact the law relevant 
to property rights and securities, and encourage the effective administration of 
insolvent estates.7 It was further recommended that: 
[a]ny departure from this approach should only be countenanced by reference 
to clearly defined principles or policies which enjoy general community 
support.8 
The independent development of bankruptcy, corporate and taxation laws has 
facilitated the current relational difficulties. This is exacerbated by the modern 
development of law as a process of reaction to particular issues, rather than being 
made proactively with a longer-term developmental view.  For example, considerable 
inconsistency exists in relation to the collection powers of the ATO. The underlying 
principles of insolvency law were mainly determined during the 19th century, at a 
time where the Crown maintained priority over unsecured creditors. So, whilst pari 
passu has always been a general principle at law, it was not one that applied to the 
Crown. Consequently, in the event of Crown priority, there was less likelihood of 
inconsistencies in the various laws. It is also the case that powers historically 
granted to taxation authorities in relation to collection of taxation did not create 
inconsistency issues because of the pre-existing general Crown priority. 
                                                 
5  Insolvency (Tax Priorities) Legislation Amendment Act 1993 (Cth). 
6  The Australian Law Reform Commission, General Insolvency Inquiry, Report no 45, Canberra, 1988, [713]. 
7  Ibid. 
8  Australian Law Reform Commission, General Insolvency Inquiry, Report No 45, Canberra, 1988. 
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Consequently, the granting of a specific power to the taxation authority enabling the 
collection of tax in a particular manner was not of great practical concern within the 
process of insolvency since the insolvency laws already gave priority to the collection 
of the tax. Therefore, any potential clash in relation to the ATO’s collection powers 
remained largely unrecognised until such time as the Crown no longer had priority. 
There has been a managerial shift by the Federal Government in requiring 
government authorities, including the ATO, as to operate on equal footing with other 
stakeholders. Therefore that new paradigm means that the ATO is without priority 
and so it gives rise to consideration of how the ATO exercises its broader powers in 
the context of insolvency law. Do for example, the ATO’s powers effectively elevate it 
beyond the position of an ordinary creditor and hence conflict with the policy of pari 
passu?  
Further, the abolition of the specific Crown priority only went so far to deal with the 
issues that existed at the time, and the Harmer Report, while attempting to place 
taxation in a broader theoretical context, fell somewhat short of giving the 
consideration required to give full effect to the abolition of the ATO priority.We posit a 
second reason for the development of the legal inconsistency; namely that the 
taxation regime in Australia has developed exponentially since the 1980s, with the 
introduction of Capital Gains,9 Fringe Benefits10 and Goods and Services taxes.11 All 
of these taxes developed after the abolition of the general Crown priority. Further, 
the calculation of income tax liability prior to the introduction of these taxes was 
much less intrusive with respect to transactions. The subsequent development of 
Australia’s taxation regime has imposed a greater regulatory burden on businesses, 
the consequence being a flow-on effect when the business finds itself in financial 
difficulty and ultimately in the hands of a trustee or administrator. The more recent 
shift towards rescue (including arrangements) and away from bankruptcy and 
straightforward liquidations has resulted in greater opportunity for the interaction of 
the laws under consideration and in unforseen ways at the time of the abolition of 
Crown priority for collection of basic income tax liability. We suggest that in creating 
                                                 
9  Introduced in 1985 following recommendations of the made in Australia, Reform of the Australian Tax System 
(Draft White Paper) (Canberra, 1985). See generally Robin Woellner et al, Australian Taxation Law (CCH 
Australia Limited, 19th ed, 2009), [7-015] – [7-025]. 
10 Fringe Benefits Tax Assessment Act 1986 (Cth), introduced in 1986. 
11  A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 (Cth), introduced in 2000. 
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these new areas of taxation, the abolition of the Crown priority in insolvency was 
ignored because priority was viewed as being confined to income tax only. 
Therefore, the need to retain ATO’s position as an ordinary creditor in an insolvency 
context was not specifically considered in drafting the relevant legislation. 
A final contributing factor is the lack of recognition by those drafting legislation of the 
broader context that law operates, particularly laws that are commercial in nature. 
Parliament’s rush to draft legislation to cover particular areas has led to a 
specialisation and narrow focus such that the broader perspective is not 
contemplated. The consequence is that the difficulties caused by such focus causes 
further knee-jerk responses and compounds the problem. For example, legislation 
drafted in contemplation of Goods and Services Tax (GST) ignored fundamental 
aspects of corporate insolvency. 
There are two possible reasons for the current approach to legislative drafting. One 
possibility is a conscious belief that the legislation will operate according to the 
intention of those administering it as distinct from its legal meaning as interpreted 
from a plain reading of the provisions. The other possibility is that federal legislation 
is drafted exclusively around one area of law without adequate regard paid to the 
broader impact of those changes. That lack of regard might be due to (i) 
incompetence, (ii) a belief that practical operation may be effected without strict 
compliance with drafted provisions, or (iii) drafting in isolation or near isolation of 
broader impact in the area of commonwealth commercial laws. It is critically 
important that the reasons for the shortcomings are properly identified and dealt with. 
This paper posits a re-examination of the principles underlying the legislative position 
of the ATO as a non-priority creditor. It is important that requisite consideration of 
clearly defined principles be considered around the impact of the pari passu principle 
to ensure the risk of inconsistent drafting of taxation laws is minimised. We suggest 
that there is evidence of a failure to recognise the insolvency position in the 
operation of the taxation legislation in Australia in key areas and concomitantly that 
there are means that the ATO obtains a possibly unintended statutory priority over 
unsecured creditors where a corporation becomes insolvent. The latter is evidenced 
by recent litigation where the Courts have struggled with the resolution of the 
6 
 
 
inconsistencies. Examples include liability for remittance of GST of an insolvent 
entity, and garnishee notices issued by the ATO.12 
GST and incapacitated entities 
The GST was implemented through the A New Tax System (Goods and Services) 
Tax Act 1999 (Cth) (‘the GST Act’), and has operated in Australia since 1 July 2000. 
Prior to December 2009, Division 147 of the GST Act contained provisions that dealt 
specifically with representatives of incapacitated entities. For the purposes of the 
GST Act, an ‘incapacitated entity’ is a person who is bankrupt as well as an entity 
which is in liquidation or receivership or has a ‘representative’. The term 
‘representative’ is then broadly defined to include, among many others, trustees in 
bankruptcy, liquidators and administrators.13 
The former s 147-5 primarily required that the representative of an incapacitated 
entity register for GST purposes where the incapacitated entity had been registered 
or was required to be registered. Typically, the consequence of registration for GST 
purposes is that the registered entity is liable to the Commissioner for GST payable14 
on ‘taxable supplies’15 made by that entity. Taxable supplies are defined by the GST 
Act to be those which are connected with Australia, and are made for consideration 
in the furtherance of an enterprise being carried on by the supplier. 16  To be 
registered, the entity must be carrying on, or intending to carry on, an enterprise, 17 
and an entity which meets certain threshold turnover requirements must register.18  
According to the explanatory memorandum supporting the introduction of the GST 
Act, the purpose of s 147-5 was to ensure that on insolvency, the representative who 
is usually in the position of making supplies and acquisitions that are subject to GST 
is liable for payment of the GST owing, rather than the entity.19 However, there were 
difficulties with these provisions in that Div 147 did not specifically establish who was 
                                                 
12  See for example, Colin Anderson and David Morrison, 'Never Give In: Recent ATO Claims in Insolvency' 
(Paper presented at the Adelaide Insolvency Forum, University of Adelaide, 25 September 2009). 
13  A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 (Cth), s 195-1. 
14  Ibid, s 9-40. 
15  Ibid, ss 7-1; 7-15. 
16  Ibid, s 9-5. Both supply and enterprise being defined very widely. 
17  Ibid, s 23-10. 
18  Ibid, s 23-15. 
19  Explanatory Memorandum, A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Bill 1998 (Cth), [6.271]. 
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to be liable for GST.20 In addition, the legislation did not recognise that in the case of 
corporate insolvency the insolvency practitioner was not making the supply directly 
but was normally only controlling an entity that may have been making the supply.  
It is relevant to note the language employed by the GST Act as being one that 
describes liability for GST as requiring “you [emphasis added] must pay the GST 
payable on any taxable supply that you make.”21 A taxable supply is one that “you 
make” in “the course or furtherance of an enterprise that you carry on”.22 Similar 
reference to the word “you” is made in the context of creditable acquisitions where 
an entity is entitled to a GST credit.23 The term “you” is defined by s 195-1 of the 
GST Act as one  applying to entities generally, unless its application is expressly 
limited. As there was no express limitation in Div 147, the term “you” might be 
interpreted to mean either the representative or the entity was liable to pay GST (in 
the context of an insolvent corporation). In the absence of any clear statutory 
definition of liability, the ATO historically interpreted the GST Act to define the 
representative as being liable on the basis of the following statement in the 
explanatory memorandum to the GST Act: 
6.272 The representative is personally liable for the GST payable and for the 
other requirements of the Bill. The representative is liable from the date on 
which he or she becomes entitled to act for you (the principal) until he or she 
ceases to be so entitled. The representative is liable for GST, entitled to input 
tax credits and has any adjustments attributable to that period.  
6.273 During that period the effect of Division 147 is that the representative 
rather than the principal is carrying on the enterprise. The representative is 
not personally liable for GST attributable before he or she becomes entitled to 
act for the principal.24 
In Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v PM Developments Pty Ltd 25  (‘PM 
Developments’) the Federal Court rejected the Commissioner’s interpretation, 
                                                 
20  For a complete discussion of this issue, see Colin Anderson and David Morrison, 'GST and Insolvency 
Practitioner Liability: Who are You?' (2001) 11 Revenue Law Journal 23. 
21  A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 (Cth), s 9-40. 
22  A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 (Cth), s 9-5. 
23  Ibid, s 11-5. 
24   Explanatory Memorandum, A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Bill 1998 (Cth). 
25   [2008] FCA 1886. 
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holding that the liquidator was not liable for GST upon insolvency.  In delivering his 
judgment, Logan J was particularly critical of the Commissioner’s reliance on the 
explanatory memorandum, citing the High Court decision of Project Blue Sky Inc v 
Australian Broadcasting Authority26 as a reminder of the importance of interpreting 
the statute as a whole and that “reconciliation of conflicting provisions may well 
require the ascertainment of which is the leading provision to which others in 
apparent conflict should yield so as to achieve, if possible, a conformity of 
meaning.”27 
Furthermore, Logan J held that the position of corporate insolvency and bankruptcy 
should be contrasted, holding that in the case of the former a winding up order does 
not affect the beneficial ownership of a corporation’s assets. By contrast, in the case 
of bankruptcy, s 58(1)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 operates so as to vest the 
property of the bankrupt in the Official Trustee or registered trustee.28 Thus, it was 
held that where property has not vested in the liquidator or receiver, the taxable 
supply is that made by the incapacitated entity and therefore one made by the entity 
in its own right. GST is, therefore, an expense that is to be dispersed to unsecured 
creditors in accordance with the rules around priority of distribution of assets upon 
winding up set out in s 556(1)(a) of the Corporations Act. 
The impact of PM Developments is that the ATO does not have priority when assets 
subject to security are sold because the GST on the sale is not an expense of the 
insolvency practitioner personally but merely one of the entity. To overcome the 
impact of this decision, the ATO swiftly drafted amending legislation that repealed 
Div 147 retrospectively from 1 July 2000.29 Its replacement, Division 58, clearly 
provides that the representative is liable for any GST payable on insolvency, 
irrespective of whether it is the entity or the representative that enters into the 
transaction.30 Again, the original paragraphs of the explanatory memorandum to the 
GST Bill are cited in support of the proposed amendments, and the purpose of 
enacting the amending legislation is “to ensure the law achieves the stated policy 
                                                 
26   (1998) 194 CLR 335. 
27  Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v PM Developments Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 1886, [26]. 
28  Ibid, [29]. 
29 Tax Laws Amendment (2009 Measure No 5) Act 2009 (Cth). 
30  A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 (Cth), s 58-10. 
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objective.”31 This suggests that the amending legislation is apparently necessary to 
ensure that the impact of the PM Developments decision is reversed since it is 
inconsistent with the policy objectives of the GST Act.32 
While Div 58 appears to address this particular inconsistency through a more 
specific adoption of the policy objectives of the GST Act, the GST Act is now 
inconsistent with the policy objectives underpinning s 555 of the Corporations Act 
2001. The conflict was specifically drawn to Parliament’s attention in the tabling of 
the amending provisions.33 However, it appears to have been lost in the debate.34 
This is problematic, since the absence of proper debate means this legislation 
cannot be considered a departure from the principle of pari passu principle  
“countenanced by reference to clearly defined principles or policies which enjoy 
general community support”.35 It is difficult to discern any “principles” in the approach 
taken in the legislation other than ensuring the position of the ATO is maintained. 
Further, while the amendments to the GST may well have addressed a singular 
interpretation issue that arose in relation to the former Div 147, it appears that the 
hasty enactment of Div 58 has caused further conflict; namely between Div 58 and 
Div 105, the latter a deeming provision that effectively makes a creditor liable for the 
GST payable on taxable supplies of a debtor’s property where that supply is in 
satisfaction of a debt owed to the creditor.36 Division 105 was enacted to deal with 
those situations where the holder of a secured charge takes control of the asset 
subject to the charge. The typical example is where a mortgagee in possession 
                                                 
31  Explanatory Memorandum, A Tax Laws Amendment (2009 Measure No 5) Bill 2009 (Cth), [1.18]. 
32  See for example, Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 16 September 2009, 
9714 (Bill Shorten, Parliamentary Secretary for Disabilities and Children’s Services and Victorian Bushfire 
Reconstruction) which states: “the [PM Developments] decision is contrary to the stated intention that the 
representative of an incapacitated entity is liable for GST on transactions within the scope of its appointment. It 
is also contrary to the commissioner’s administration of the law since the introduction of the GST”. 
33  See for example, Department of Parliamentary Services (Cth),Bills Digest, No 46 of 2009-10, 23 October 
2009, 3-5. 
34   The bill was introduced as one of several non-related taxation law amendments, including broadening of the 
scope of the Victorian Bushfire Appeal Fund Independent Advisory Panel in relation to supporting people 
affected by the 2009 Victorian bushfires. Therefore, to the extent the GST amendments were debated, the 
discussion was limited to ensuring that the legislation addressed to the original policy objectives of the GST 
Act, and possible revenue impact of the court’s decision in PM Developments. See for example, 
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 28 October 2009, 11403 (Craig Thomsom), 
11404 
35 as required by the Harmer Report 
36  See for example ATO ID 2010/224 “GST and mortgagees in possession: selling the property of a 
corporation”. 
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exercises its power of sale, and that sale is normally subject to GST, then GST is 
payable by the mortgagee even though that transfer is of the debtor’s property.  
It seems the difficulty stems from the change in the definition of “incapacitated entity” 
given effect in the 2009 amendments. Prior to the 2009 amendments the definition of 
an incapacitated entity included, (in the case of a company), one that had gone into 
liquidation or receivership as well as one that had a representative appointed. The 
word “representative” was subsequently defined in s 195-1 to include trustees in 
bankruptcy, liquidators, receivers and administrators of both a voluntary 
administration and a deed of company arrangement. Somewhat oddly, it also 
includes a person appointed or authorised to manage the affairs of the entity 
because it was unable to pay its debts. Whatever that particular phrase may mean, it 
seems that this inclusion and the definition more generally does not include a person 
who is simply an agent for the mortgagee in possession. This is understandable 
since it is dealt with by Div 105. 
However, ex-post Div 58, inconsistency issues are apparent, the first related again to 
the definition of terms. It is surprising that in amending the legislation to correct the 
problems with Div 147, it was felt necessary to include the term “controller” in the 
definition of representative. In adding that term, the explanatory memorandum 
stated: 
A consequential amendment will be made to the definition of 'representative' 
in Division 195 to include a reference to a 'controller'. A controller is a form of 
external administrator relating to corporations and should therefore be 
included as a representative for the purposes of the GST Act.37 
The fact that the definition was extended in this way suggests a lack of 
understanding of the operation of Part 5.2 of the Corporations Act where the terms 
receiver and controller are used. As the heading to Part 5.2 of the Corporations Act 
indicates, both receivers and other controllers deal with the property of corporations. 
The Corporations Act does extend certain powers of sale to receivers (as does the 
instrument of the appointment usually) but there is no such legislative extension to 
controllers. Given that Div 105 covers the position of a creditor selling a debtor’s 
                                                 
37 Tax Laws Amendment (2009 measures No. 5) Bill 2009 (Cth) Explanatory Memorandum at [98]. 
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property where it is in satisfaction of a debt, it is difficult to understand the need to 
extend the definition of ‘representative’ and hence ‘incapacitated entity’ in this way. 
Given the problems with Div 147 that gave rise to these amendments, greater effort 
might have been made in the drafting to ensure that confusion did not emerge again.  
Unfortunately this did not occur and there now are these further difficulties with the 
new provisions that show a lack of appreciation of the context of the tax legislation in 
an insolvency process. 
However, there are further problems with Div 58, yet to be explored by the courts or 
the commentary. Division 58 contains the bulk of the operative provisions dealing 
with insolvency practitioners. Section 58-5 sets out some general statements in 
respect of “incapacitated entities”. 38  It makes the supply, acquisition etc of the 
representative of an incapacitated entity that of the entity. There continues to be a 
lack of clarity around this wording. The explanatory memorandum stated that: 
This ensures that the GST consequences that arise from a supply, acquisition 
or importation of the representative are the same as the consequences that 
would have arisen as if they were a supply, acquisition or importation of the 
incapacitated entity.39 
The effect is, therefore, to effectively reverse the position that would otherwise 
operate in the case of a bankrupt individual. In those circumstances as the property 
of the bankrupt vests in the trustee, this provision has the effect of rendering the 
action to have been done by the bankrupt. Presumably the deeming effect is 
extended to the registration by the trustee because of s 58-5(2). In order to give 
effect to the intent this would have to be presumed to be the case although the 
language is very general. So when the trustee registers in their own name,40 it 
seems that it is necessary to presume that the trustee is undertaking an act in their 
capacity as a representative and that this is in fact registration by the bankrupt. If that 
is not the case then there is a similar issue to that which existed before Div 58 was 
inserted in that not all of the elements required for a taxable supply would be 
present.  
                                                 
38 It is unfortunate that the legislation continues to use the term “incapacitated entities” in respect of these 
provisions for as was shown in the PM Developments case in the case of a corporation, the company remains in 
existence despite the appointment of an external administrator. 
39 Tax Laws Amendment (2009 measures No. 5) Bill 2009 (Cth) Explanatory Memorandum at [12]. 
40 As required by s 58-20.  
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The major difficulty arising from Div 58, however, relates to s 58-10. In that section41 
(key to the position of the insolvency practitioner and GST liability), the 
representative is made liable and entitled to credit only “to the extent that the making 
of the supply, importation or acquisition …is within the scope of the representative’s 
responsibility or authority for managing the incapacitated entity’s affairs.” On a 
superficial reading of this section, one might be fooled into believing this solves the 
liability problem. However, we argue that the legislation is still drafted in a way that is 
problematic, both in terms of clarity and the operation of Div 58 as follows:  
First, the wording adopted by Div 58-10 is not clear. It is argued that the wording 
leaves uncertain the precise liability of an appointed insolvency practitioner, 
particularly by requiring that the insolvency practitioner is liable to the extent that the 
GST liability is “within the scope of the representative’s responsibility or authority for 
managing the incapacitated entity’s affairs”. 42  Does the insolvency practitioner 
become liable if the transaction were beyond his or her powers? An example may be 
where a receiver sells goods that were subject to a valid retention of title clause. This 
can hardly be said to be within the scope of their responsibility or authority. The 
position under a deed of company arrangement seems to be particularly unclear. 
What is the scope of the representative’s “responsibility or authority” for managing 
the incapacitated entity’s affairs under a deed of company arrangement? This will 
depend upon the terms of deed of company arrangement itself.43 It is possible for the 
drafting of the deed to effectively control such responsibility and authority for 
management because the terms of the deed of company arrangement can alter the 
role played by its administrator. There is nothing in the Corporations Act setting out 
the deed administrator’s responsibility or authority for managing the incapacitated 
entity’s affairs.  
Another issue around wording is that s 58-10 (2) and s 58-10 (3) both declare that 
the representative is not liable for or entitled to GST credit related amounts to the 
extent that consideration for the taxable supply or creditable acquisition is received 
or provided as the case may be before the appointment to the entity. This appears to 
leave open the liability of the insolvency practitioner for GST on taxable supplies and 
                                                 
41 Specifically in s 58-10(1). 
42  Section 58-10(1). 
43 North Sydney District Rugby League Football Club v Hill [2000] NSWSC 249. 
13 
 
 
importations or the entitlement to credits on creditable acquisitions that occur before 
the appointment to the entity provided that the consideration is paid or received (as 
the case may be) after appointment. 
As noted, the wording of s 58-10(1) only makes the insolvency practitioner liable 
when the making of the relevant supply, (GST or input tax credit) is within the 
representative’s responsibility or authority. It is clear that insolvency practitioners in 
all administrations, are not responsible for, nor do they have authority over, the entity 
before their appointment. Thus there could never be any liability existing under s 58-
10(1) for those transactions occurring before their appointment. However, the 
examples in the explanatory memorandum suggest the opposite effect. The fact that 
the representative is not liable (or entitled to a refund) follows from the wording in s 
58-10(1) and refers to the “making of the supply, importation or acquisition”. The 
difficulty with the interpretation of the wording in s 58-10(1) in the event of overlap, is 
that the GST legislation does not make provision for when a supply takes place. 
Rather, it attributes the tax to a particular period based upon the issuing of an invoice 
or the receipt of the consideration. For example: a company enters into a contract to 
sell goods on 1 July and the goods and an invoice are delivered on 15 July. On 16 
July an administrator is appointed. On 1 August, the customer pays for the goods 
delivered on July 15. The suggestion from the explanatory memorandum is that in 
these circumstances the representative is personally liable for the GST on the sale. 
We submit that no such liability arises given the wording in s 58-10(1) because the 
supply was not made within the scope of the administrator’s responsibility or 
authority. 
The explanatory memorandum provides an example where a contract is entered into 
to build a shed by a company that enters into administration prior to the 
commencement of construction. The example states that “the administrator agrees 
with the customer that the construction of the shed will continue”. Presumably this is 
the basis on which it is assumed that the supply has been within the scope of the 
representative’s responsibility or authority. It is possible however to suggest that the 
supply was made when the company entered into the contract rather than when the 
shed is actually delivered. The insolvency practitioner takes the company with all of 
its contracts already in existence and the impact depends upon the nature and terms 
of the contract itself. The position will vary with the particular circumstances and 
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facts in every case; hence it is not possible to generalise and to be certain that a 
receipt after appointment means there was a supply made within scope of the 
authority or responsibility of the insolvency practitioner. 
Section 58-10 must be read in conjunction with s 58-40; the latter sets out the 
attribution rules if the entity is operating on a non-cash basis. In relation to attribution 
rules, Div 29 has the effect of attributing the GST on a taxable supply to the period 
when any of the consideration is received or an invoice is issued (provided the cash 
basis is not being used). However it does not attribute the supply to any particular 
time. The legislation appears to be silent on when a supply is made. The legislation 
does contain s 58-40 which refers to attributing the GST to a period applying to the 
representative rather than the incapacitated entity but this is clearly made dependent 
upon the representative being liable under s 58-10.44 Thus, if the representative is 
not liable under s 58-10 then s 58-40 has no application. This creates a problem of 
circularity and simply returns the problem back to a consideration of when the 
supply, acquisition or importation is considered to be within the scope of the 
representative’s responsibility or authority if in fact it occurs before appointment. 
Section 156-17 deems a supply made “for a period or on a progressive basis; and for 
consideration that is to be provided on a progressive or periodic basis” to be 
separate supplies of each progressive or periodic component. Division 156 deals 
with situations where there is a long-term lease, hiring arrangement or subscription. 
Thus, it seems to apply to those circumstances rather than deal specifically with the 
situation where a contract for one item is entered into but an insolvency practitioner 
is appointed before the payment is received. Division 156 therefore does address the 
issue of when a supply is made.   
The Corporations Act provides a clear delineation of when an insolvency practitioner 
is liable for debts incurred in the course of the administration.45 There seems no 
reason why Div 58 could not have adopted this type of delineation in the context of 
liability for Goods and Services Tax.  
With respect to the GST, one simple option is to make any insolvency practitioner 
liable for any GST, and entitled to any input tax credit or adjustment of the company 
                                                 
44 See s 58-40(1)(b). 
45 See for example s 443A in the case of an administrator and s 419 in respect of a receiver.  
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from the time of their appointment. The only difficulty with such a position is where 
more than one type of administration is in place at the same time. This may have 
been a drafting concern when the legislation was contemplated. However, the 
legislation could provide that where more than one representative is acting at the 
same time in the same company, the liability for the GST or the entitlement to the 
input tax credit would flow to the representative who caused the entity to make the 
supply, importation or acquisition that the GST, input tax credit or adjustment relates. 
Adoption of this suggestion provides a much clearer means of making the relevant 
representative liable. 
The questions arising around the extent of the insolvency practitioner’s liability for 
the GST raised herein suggest that either there was a lack of consideration of how 
the insolvency processes operate or, in the alternative amount to a deliberate 
attempt to gain a preference or advantage for the ATO as creditor in respect of these 
matters. Either is a troubling possibility given the background to the amendments 
made in 2009 and the broader policy objective of treating all creditors including the 
ATO equally. It is clear, therefore, that a more cohesive approach is required for the 
future development of this law. 
ATO garnishee notices 
Another example of statutory priority conflict is that between s 260-5 of Schedule 1 to 
the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) and ss 500 and 501 of the Corporations 
Act. Division 260 of Schedule 1 to the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) 
provides the Commissioner with the power to issue effectively a garnishee notice 
over money owed by a third party in respect of certain tax liabilities owed by an 
insolvent company. Specifically, s 260-5 provides that the Commissioner may issue 
a written notice requiring payment of tax-related liabilities to a third party of a 
taxpayer where the third party owes, or may later owe, money to that taxpayer. The 
issuing of this notice creates a statutory charge in favour of the Commissioner.46 
Failure to comply with the notice is an offence.47 
                                                 
46  Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Lanstel Pty Ltd (1996) 22 ACSR 314, Deputy Commissioner of Taxation 
(NSW) v Donnelly (1989) 89 ALR 232, Robin Woellner et al, Australian Taxation Law (CCH Australia Limited, 
19th ed, 2009). 
47  Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth), Sch 1 s 260-20 
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Specific provisions are included in the Taxation Administration Act 1953 in relation to 
insolvent companies. Section 260-45 requires that the appointed liquidator give 
written notice of his or her appointment to the Commissioner. The Commissioner 
must then, as soon as practicable, notify the liquidator of the amount required for the 
discharge the outstanding tax-related liabilities of the insolvent entity. Upon notice, 
the liquidator must set aside the required amount in accordance with a proportionate 
formula. Failure to do so is a criminal offence.48  
Section 500 of the Corporations Act requires that “any attachment, sequestration, 
distress or execution put in force against the property of the company after the 
passing of the resolution for voluntary winding up is void.” Therefore, where the 
s 260-5 notice is considered to be an ‘attachment’ that is issued to a third party 
subsequent to the resolution to wind up the corporation, the notice will be considered 
void and the property that is subject to the notice will then be available for distribution 
to all creditors. However, if the notice is not an attachment, then the Commissioner 
will retain statutory priority over the property. 
The issues relevant to this area of conflict in relation to a corporation that 
commenced a creditors’ voluntary winding up were recently considered by the High 
Court in Bruton Holdings Pty Limited (in liquidation) v Commissioner of Taxation 
[2009] HCA 32. The case involved a trustee (Bruton Holdings Pty Limited) of a 
charitable trust (Bruton Educational Trust) established for the primary purpose of 
providing educational scholarships. During the period from 2004 to 2007, Bruton 
Holdings Pty Limited (‘Bruton’) engaged the services of a firm of solicitors (Piper 
Alderman) to act in a dispute with the Commissioner over the endorsement of the 
trust as a charity, the status being necessary to provide the trust with concessional 
tax treatment. During this period, Bruton paid a significant amount of money to retain 
Piper Alderman’s services. In 2007, it was resolved by the creditors of Bruton that 
the corporation be wound up. Following this resolution, the Commissioner served 
several s 260-5 notices on Piper Alderman requiring the payment of outstanding tax 
liabilities of Bruton. Bruton applied to the Federal Court to have the s 260-5 notices 
set aside. Two of the three notices issued were ultimately rendered void as to form.49 
                                                 
48  Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth), Sch 1 s 260-50. 
49  Bruton Holdings Pty Ltd (In liq) v Commissioner of Taxation [2007] FCA 1643 per Ryan, Mansfield and 
Dowsett JJ. 
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However, the validity of the other notice as an attachment was the subject matter of 
the appeal to the High Court. 
In the first instance, the Federal Court held that the s 260-5 notice was an 
attachment and therefore void pursuant to s 500 of the Corporations Act on the basis 
that Crown priorities for tax debts had been abolished.50 The Full Federal Court did 
not agree, and commented that: 
We accept that such priority has been largely abrogated. However, in Deputy 
Commissioner of Taxation v Dexcam Australia Pty Ltd (2003) 129 FCR 582, 
the Full Court held that such abrogation did not necessarily revoke all 
provisions which confer an advantage upon the Commissioner. The decision 
of the High Court in Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Broadbeach 
Properties Pty Ltd (2008) 248 ALR 693 at [61] demonstrates that any conflict 
between the operation of two statutes cannot usually be resolved by reference 
to policy considerations underlying one without reference to policy 
considerations underlying the other.51 
Instead, the Full Federal Court adopted the reasoning of an earlier bankruptcy 
decision52 in concluding that the word ‘attachment’ is narrowly construed by analogy 
to s 569 of the Corporations Act, a section that limits the term ‘attachment’ to those 
methods of recovery involving a court process. Therefore, as the issuing of a s 260-5 
notice does not involve the court, it could not be an attachment for the purpose of s 
500 of the Corporations Act. The Full Federal Court’s decision would therefore 
create a statutory charge in favour of the Commissioner, and as it was not void 
pursuant to s 500, would grant the Commissioner priority over other unsecured 
creditors. 
The difficulty with the Full Federal Court’s decision is that it is inconsistent with s 501 
of the Corporations Act. Section 501 requires that for a voluntary winding up, the 
property of a company is to be distributed equally. This section is consistent with the 
pari passu principle. The Full Federal Court opined: 
                                                 
50  Ibid, [56]. 
51  Commissioner of Taxation v Bruton Holdings Pty Limited (in liq) [2008] FCAFC 184, [71]. 
52  Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (NSW) v Donnelly (1989) 89 ALR 232. 
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In our view, the relevant question is whether a notice given pursuant to 
s 260-5, after the commencement of the winding up, affects the operation of 
s 501. That question has not been argued, and so we refrain from expressing 
a concluded view. However it is at least arguable that the statutory mandate 
imposed by s 501 overrides any later charge created by a s 260-5 notice. If 
so, then s 260-5 is not inconsistent with the structure of the Corporations 
Act.53 
It is difficult nonetheless to reconcile the Court’s earlier statement that the policy 
considerations of both the corporate, bankruptcy and taxation legislation are to be 
considered in terms of resolving any conflict in their operation. Subsequently, the Full 
Federal Court’s decision was overturned by the High Court in 2009 the latter 
deciding that the s 260-5 notice was void, and as a result, the Commissioner did not 
obtain priority. The High Court stated that the critical issue to be determined was: 
whether, after the passing of the resolution for the winding up of the appellant, 
the property of that company, which, subject to “preferential payments” 
[footnote omitted], must be applied in the manner prescribed by ss 501 and 
555 of the Corporations Act, could be diminished by the subsequent 
engagement of s 260-5 in Sch 1 to the Administration Act. The answer to that 
question requires consideration both of the relationship between the two 
statutes of the Commonwealth and also of the relationship between provisions 
of the Administration Act.54 
In reaching its decision, the High Court referred to s 260-45 that specifically provides 
a regime whereby the Commissioner ensures effective discharge of the outstanding 
tax liabilities of the insolvent corporation. The section does not, however, provide the 
Commissioner with priority over other creditors, and the amount of taxation ultimately 
paid in a manner consistent with ss 501 and 555, requiring equal distribution. The 
Court also contrasted legislative history of s 500(1) to that of s 118 of the Bankruptcy 
Act 1966 (Cth), as well as the wording and purpose of s 569 of the Corporations Act 
that the Full Federal Court’s reasoning relied upon.55  
                                                 
53  Commissioner of Taxation v Bruton Holdings Pty Limited (in liq) [2008] FCAFC 184, [70]. 
54  Bruton Holdings Pty Ltd (In liq) v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 239 CLR 346, [9]. 
55  Ibid, [35]-[37]. 
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The final result is that while the High Court has definitively stated that a s 260-5 
notice is an attachment, and therefore void pursuant to s 500 of the Corporations 
Act, it is clear that the Court struggled with determining the appropriate principle to 
be applied. The decision did not address other forms of insolvency administrations 
such as personal bankruptcy, voluntary administration and receivership. The power 
of the ATO in this respect differs therefore depending upon whether the company is 
in receivership, voluntary administration or liquidation. As a matter of insolvency 
policy it would seem desirable that the rights of the ATO should be same no matter 
what form of insolvency administration is in place. Legislative change is the only way 
to achieve this consistency in this respect.  
Other problem areas 
There are additional potential conflicts that are recently emerging. One example 
relates to statutory priorities previously afforded to the ATO. The Harmer Report 
expressed concerns that the statutory priority retained by the ATO allowed the 
insolvent corporation to accumulate tax debts at the disadvantage of other 
unsecured creditors without any of the associated risk being attached to the 
Commissioner.56 As a result, the Commissioner had no incentive to recover its debts 
in a commercial manner. In drafting the 1993 legislation that ultimately abolished the 
Commissioner’s statutory priority over instalment deductions and withholding tax, the 
Commissioner was granted certain administrative powers aimed at enabling the ATO 
to respond quickly to recover unpaid tax liabilities and preventing directors of 
insolvent corporations from incurring further debts.57 In short, the 1993 amendments 
enabled the Commissioner to issue recovery notices for unpaid tax liabilities based 
on an estimation of that amount 58  and impose a penalty on directors for the 
unremitted amounts of unpaid tax liabilities. These powers were contained in the 
former Div 9 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth). Division 9 was 
supplemented by s 588FGA of the Corporations Act that indemnifies the 
Commissioner against directors where an insolvent corporation pays its tax debt, 
                                                 
56 Australian Law Reform Commission, General Insolvency Inquiry, Report No 45, Canberra, 1988, [735]. 
57  Michael Murray, 'The ATO as an Insolvency Regulator?' (2007) 19(3) (September 2007) Australian 
Insolvency Journal 24. 
58  The previous legislation required that the Commissioner determine the exact amount before any legal action 
to recover the amount could be taken. See Explanatory Memorandum, The Insolvency (Tax Priorities) 
Legislation Amendment Bill 1993 (Cth). 
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and that debt is later recovered as a voidable preference payment.59 The combined 
effect of these provisions is to place the Commissioner in the position of being a 
guaranteed creditor.60 
In 2010, Div 9 was rewritten as Div 269 of Schedule 1 to the Taxation Administration 
Act 1953 (Cth).61 In theory, the rewrite does not involve significant policy changes.62 
However, that does not necessarily mean that these amendments are being 
considered in relation to the policy objectives of insolvency law. In addition, the 
rewrite introduced new provisions which expand Subdiv 255–D of Schedule 1 to the 
Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth), requiring the taxpayer provide the 
Commissioner with a security deposit in certain circumstances, such that taxpayers 
must now include a security deposit for any existing or future tax-related liabilities.  
 This amendment is designed to address ‘phoenix activity’ whereby the corporate 
taxpayer fraudulently avoids the payment of liabilities by transferring corporate 
assets to an alternate corporation for no consideration.63 At this stage it is unclear 
how effective the provisions are or their wider impact in the context of corporate law 
and insolvency law. 
 
Theories of equality: The current approach to developing corporate, 
bankruptcy and taxation law 
While much of the conflict is identified by academic literature,64 there is little analysis 
around the resolution of the problem of conflicting laws. We submit that our analysis 
shows Australian taxation legislation is currently drafted inconsistently with the 
                                                 
59  For voidable preference payments, see generally Div 2, Part 5.7B of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 
60  Matthew Broderick, 'Company Directors: Federal Taxation Liabilities and Obligations When Nearing 
Insolvency: Part II' (2009) 38(2) (May 2009) Australian Tax Review 86, 87. 
61  Tax Laws Amendment (Transfer of Provisions) Act 2010 (Cth), assented to 26 June 2010 and  
62  Department of Parliamentary Services (Cth),Bills Digest, No 153 of 2009-10, 26 May 2010,, 3. 
63  Explanatory Memorandum, Tax Laws Amendment (Transfer of Provisions) Bill 2010 (Cth). 
64  See for example, Christopher F Symes, Statutory Priorities in Corporate Insolvency Law: An Analysis of 
Preferred Creditor Status, Markets and the Law (Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2008); Colin Anderson and 
David Morrison, 'GST and Insolvency Practitioner Liability: Who are You?' (2001) 11 Revenue Law Journal 23; 
Colin Anderson and David Morrison, 'Never Give In: Recent ATO Claims in Insolvency' (Paper presented at the 
Adelaide Insolvency Forum, University of Adelaide, 25 September 2009 2009); Ben Kelly, 'GST and 
Insolvency: A Difficult Area' (Paper presented at the 2009 National GST Intensive Conference, Melbourne 
2009); David Walter and Lawrence Mendes, 'ATO Garnishee Notices and Crystallised Floating Charges: Re 
Octaviar Ltd (No 8)' (2009) 10(2) (September 2009) Insolvency Law Bulletin 18; Christopher F Symes, 
'Reminiscing the Taxation Priorities in Insolvency' (2005) 1(2) Journal of the Australasian Tax Teachers 
Association 435. 
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principle of pari passu. The question remains,however, whether taxation law ought to 
be drafted consistently with the pari passu principle? Symes, for example, suggests 
that it is questionable whether, in hindsight, the removal of the Commissioner’s 
statutory priority debt recovery has had a direct impact on the improvement of the 
debt recovery problems that removing priority aimed to achieve.65 It may be that the 
improvements experienced in relation to debt recovery and, therefore, funds 
available to be distributed to unsecured creditors, is due more to the provisions 
introduced around voluntary administration. With much of the relevant legislative 
change occurring at the same time, it is difficult to precisely determine cause and 
effect. We submit however that careful consideration of the underlying principles of 
bankruptcy, corporate insolvency and taxation law is required and that potential 
conflict be taken into account.  
In relation to insolvency, pari passu is historically the preferred principle for the 
determination of unsecured creditor claims in the event of insolvency. However, the 
principle of pari passu is not without criticism.66 For example, Mokal argues that 
there is no such ‘normal rule’ that all creditors are treated equally due to the fact that 
the pari passu rule will ultimately not apply to secured creditors and preferential 
claims.67 Mokal contends that the pari passu principle does not accurately explain 
the law regarding decisions about the distribution of assets on insolvency as “[i]t 
neither imposes a requirement which insolvency must fill, nor does it shape that law 
in any way.”68 Therefore, he proposes that underlying objective of ‘equality’ as used 
in insolvency is aimed at producing some level of fairness, rather than formal 
equality, that states the same rules apply to all people.69 Furthermore, Australia is 
yet to develop a comprehensive theoretical framework for the determination of 
statutory priority.70 
                                                 
65 Christopher F Symes, 'Reminiscing the Taxation Priorities in Insolvency' (2005) 1(2) Journal of the 
Australasian Tax Teachers Association 435, 446. 
66 See for example, Rizwaan Jameel Mokal, 'Priority as Pathology: The Pari Passu Myth' (2001) 60(3) 
(November 2001) Cambridge Law Journal 581. 
67  Rizwaan Jameel Mokal, Corporate insolvency law: Theory and application (Oxford University Press, 2005), 
96. 
68  Rizwaan Jameel Mokal, 'Priority as Pathology: The Pari Passu Myth' (2001) 60(3) (November 2001) 
Cambridge Law Journal 581, 584. 
69  Ibid, 606-607. 
70  C F Symes, Statutory Priorities in Corporate Insolvency Law: An Analysis of Preferred Creditor Status, 
Markets and the Law (Ashgate Publishing Limited, Surrey: 2008), 51.  
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The High Court in International Air Transport Association v Ansett Australia Holdings 
Limited rejects the argument that pari passu plays a broad role in the interpretation 
of insolvency legislation. Speaking to the argument submitted by Ansett that there 
was an overreaching rule of public policy that there be equal treatment of creditors 
the majority stated 71  
…in the present case the argument of Ansett proceeded from the premise that 
no provision of the Corporations Act has the effect which it was submitted that 
the asserted rule of public policy had. Ansett submitted that the Court should 
nonetheless recognise and apply an overarching rule of public policy that 
would supplement the express provisions of the Act. These submissions 
should be rejected.  
This suggests that the principle needs to be explicitly part of the legislation to have 
meaningful impact. The difficulty is that the drafters of taxation legislation are unlikely 
to incorporate such a term explicitly.   
Taxation is oft viewed as a mechanism for achieving economic equality in society 
through the redistribution of wealth.72 Therefore, one of the cornerstone objectives in 
designing a taxation system is that of equity. By way of example, the introduction of 
a capital gains regime was first recommended by the Asprey Committee Report and 
the Draft White Paper on the basis of both horizontal and vertical equity.73 In fact, it 
was stated in the Asprey Committee Report that: 
It is on grounds of equity that, in the Committee’s view, the arguments for a 
capital gains tax may reasonably be held to be so strong as to overwhelm the 
admittedly strong case against it on grounds of simplicity.74 
This notion of equity was explicitly recognised by the Australian government which 
provided the following as a term of reference for the recent Australia's Future Tax 
System Review (‘the Henry Review’): 
                                                 
71 International Air Transport Association v Ansett Australia Holdings Limited [2008] HCA 3 (6 February 2008) 
at [75] per Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ 
72   Australia, Reform of the Australian Tax System (Draft White Paper) (Canberra, 1985), 
73 Australia, Reform of the Australian Tax System (Draft White Paper) (Canberra, 1985),  
74  Australia, Reform of the Australian Tax System (Draft White Paper) (Canberra, 1985), [23.12]. 
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Raising revenue should be done so as to do least harm to economic 
efficiency, provide equity (horizontal, vertical and intergenerational), and 
minimise complexity for taxpayers and the community. 75 
The concept of equity in taxation generally has two dimensions: horizontal and 
vertical equity. Horizontal equity occurs when the burden of taxation is imposed on 
people in similar economic circumstances in the same proportion. By contrast, 
vertical equity requires that people in different economic circumstances are treated 
differently, so that the wealthier members of society bear a greater proportion of the 
burden of taxation. Vertical equity, in this sense, translates to substantive, rather 
than formative, equality. However, both horizontal and vertical concepts of equity are 
inherently difficult concepts to define. 76  Furthermore, the consideration of an 
equitable tax system is ultimately determined by reference to individual perspectives 
and various social norms.77 Thus, equitable to one person may not be considered 
equitable to another. This was recognised by the Henry Review, that recommended: 
The tax and transfer system should treat individuals with similar economic 
capacity in the same way, while those with greater capacity should bear a 
greater net burden, or benefit less in the case of net transfers. This burden 
should change more than in proportion to the change in capacity. That is, the 
overall system should be progressive. Considerations about the equity of the 
system also need to take into account exposure to complexity and the 
distribution of compliance costs and risk.78 
A common objective for both corporate, bankruptcy and taxation law, and therefore 
legislation, is the achievement of equal distribution of scarce resources. In particular, 
it is the principle of substantive equality that is a level of equality that factors in the 
economic and social differences within the broader community, and appears a 
primary objective in the development of law relating to the distribution of assets on 
                                                 
75 See Australia’s Future Tax System Review, Terms of Reference 
http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/Content.aspx?doc=html/reference.htm. 
76J E Meade, The Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation (Allen & Unwin, 1978), p 14 available at 
http://www.ifs.org.uk/docs/meade.pdf 
Accessed 24 April 2011 
 
77  Stephen Barkoczy, Foundations of Taxation Law (CCH Australia Limited, 2009),19. 
78  Australia, Australia’s Future Tax System - Final Report 
<http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/FinalReport.aspx?doc=html/Publications/Papers/Final_Report_Part_1/
index.htm> Canberra, December 2009, 17. 
24 
 
 
insolvency and the imposition of taxation. However, a theoretical approach aimed at 
achieving substantive equality, and addressing the relevant commercial laws, is yet 
to be articulated and applied. 
Dworkin’s theory of equality as an alternative theoretical framework 
In the absence of a clearly articulated theoretical framework, it is impossible to 
determine the approach to be taken that resolves conflict between distribution on 
insolvency and the imposition of taxation. It is submitted that the principles of 
equality that Australian corporate, bankruptcy and taxation law are developed are not 
constructive in examining the fundamental basis for their future design. In particular, 
we suggest that the current theoretical approaches will continue to result in 
inconsistent law as they are too general in nature, do not take a whole-of-system 
design approach and fail to distinguish between substantive and formal equity in a 
systematic manner. At present the way that substantive equality is sought is carried 
out in a piecemeal and ad hoc way heavily influenced by political and social needs, 
and certainly not within a clearly articulated framework. Furthermore, particularly in 
taxation law, there needs to be a balancing of equality with other relevant objectives, 
such as efficiency, simplicity and sustainability, and the current underlying approach 
framework does not address such objectives cohesively. 
In relation to insolvency law, Mokal suggests a Rawlsian approach whereby “parties 
are treated as equals-and thus fairly-when their respective interests are accorded 
equal care and respect.”79 While this theoretical approach may be appropriate to 
insolvency law, it is arguable that the theory has limited application to taxation law 
since the latter requires decisions about the imposition of tax and consequent 
distribution, as opposed to the distribution of limited funds to a select group of 
people. Therefore, it is argued here that Dworkin’s theory of equality may provide an 
appropriate theoretical basis for the development of future corporate, bankruptcy and 
taxation laws. 
Dworkin’s criticises traditional liberalist theories of equality that suggests that all 
individuals are equal. He contends that “[e]quality is a popular but mysterious 
political idea” and therefore “requires that we distinguish various conceptions of 
                                                 
79  Rizwaan Jameel Mokal, 'Priority as Pathology: The Pari Passu Myth' (2001) 60(3) (November 2001) 
Cambridge Law Journal 581, 608. 
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equality, in order to decide which of these conceptions (or which combination) states 
an attractive political idea, if any does.” 80  In his series on theories of equality, 
Dworkin examines several theories of distributional equality to show that differing 
theories of equality will result in diverse legal recommendations. 81  Furthermore, 
Dworkin argues that legal interpretation is much more than a mere process of 
bridging gaps in precedent through the exercise of judicial discretion, and that the 
“gravitational force of precedent rests on the idea that fairness requires the 
consistent enforcements of rights.”82  
The law is not interpreted or made in a vacuum, but rather in the context of various 
polices and principles, and the Courts use these policies and principles to ‘fit’ 
together incoherent areas of law with the aim of effecting a more coherent 
approach.83 However, Dworkin contends that principles alone should influence the 
law in terms of resolving uncertainty. 84  Thus, people are entitled to expect that 
adjudicators will treat the law as though it were a seamless web, that there are a set 
of “concrete principles that provides a coherent justification for all common law 
precedents and, so far as these are to be justified on principle, constitutional and 
statutory provisions as well.”85 Therefore, it is proposed that Dworkin’s theory will 
offer a more useful theoretical framework for the analysis of corporate, bankruptcy 
and taxation law.  
Conclusion 
It is timely that the intersection of corporate, bankruptcy and taxation legislation be 
considered by applying a more appropriate theoretical framework, particularly given 
the ongoing debate on Australian tax reform and the increased insolvency resulting 
from the global financial crisis. It is also arguable that the design principles that have 
historically supported development of taxation law are in need of review, particularly 
given that “Australia is now facing a different set of economic, social and 
environmental circumstances from those that have shaped tax and transfer policy 
                                                 
80  Ronald Dworkin, 'What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare' (1981) 10(3) Philosophy and Public Affairs 
185, 185. 
81 Ronald Dworkin, 'What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Welfare' (1981) 10(4) Philosophy and Public Affairs 
283; Ronald Dworkin, 'What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare' (1981) 10(3) Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 185. 
82  Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth, 1978), 116. 
83  Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth, 1978). 
84  Marett Leiboff and Mark Thomas, Legal Theories: Contexts and Practices (Lawbook Co, 2009), 241. 
85  Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth, 1978), 116-117. 
26 
 
 
since federation”.86 This paper demonstrates areas where taxation and insolvency 
(particularly corporate insolvency) are in conflict due to the fundamental difference in 
the purpose of each area of law. Similar interpretation issues apply also to the 
various means of dealing with corporate insolvency, such as voluntary administration 
as compared to winding up on insolvency.87 
A clearly articulated approach is therefore required to develop and interpret 
corporate, bankruptcy and taxation legislation so that the development of these 
areas of law may be more aligned. It is therefore proposed that critical analysis of the 
current regime using the theoretical approach such as the theory of equality 
proposed by Dworkin will help produce a more consistent framework. 
 
                                                 
86  Australia, Australia’s Future Tax System - Final Report 
<http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/FinalReport.aspx?doc=html/Publications/Papers/Final_Report_Part_1/
index.htm> Canberra, December 2009, 3. 
87  See generally Colin Anderson and David Morrison, 'Never Give In: Recent ATO Claims in Insolvency' 
(Paper presented at the Adelaide Insolvency Forum, University of Adelaide, 25 September 2009 2009). 
